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I. Introduction
For thousands of years, the contours of Western legal argument have
remained unchanged. Since the time of the ancient Greeks, lawyers have
been presenting arguments in the same basic format, with a heavy reliance
on the concept of logos, the idea that arguments are most persuasive when
presented in a clear deductive logical structure using clean-cut categories.
Forming the basis for the terms that appear in logocentric legal
arguments, categories allow humans to group facts and information
together into classes.1 For instance, chairs, tables, and beds occupy the
category of furniture, and cars, trucks, and motorcycles occupy the
category of vehicle. Since ancient times, humans have conceived of categories using a box metaphor—everything in the box is a member of the
category.2 However, modern cognitive science holds that human categorization choices do not take the shape of a symmetrical box. Rather,
categories take a more blurry, radial shape.3
When we study how categories affect legal meanings, it becomes
apparent that the overuse of boxed-in legal categories can produce
distortion and injustice. Although categories are helpful for converting
law’s messy landscape into a clean linear form, categories can be harmful
because they tend to erase important context from the client’s story,

1 Category, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/category (last visited March 11,
2016).
2 See RICHARD A. POSNER , THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 38 (1990).
3 See infra notes 27–29 and accompanying text.
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obscure the power relations that produce category choices, and oversimplify complex problems.4
If longstanding approaches to categorization and argumentation do
not mirror how we really think and can also produce unjust legal
outcomes, why have they remained in our legal culture for so long?
Drawing upon legal history, jurisprudential trends, and cognitive science,
this article theorizes that ancient legal-thought structures have endured so
long because they offer a way to present complex information in a clean
and structured way, which is optimal for how humans process information.
This article draws on two separate areas of cognitive science: (1) categorization theory, which relates to how humans categorize facts that exist
in the world, and (2) information processing, which explains how humans
process information in a presented form. Ironically, the studies on categorization tell us that we do not actually categorize in a neat and orderly
form, but the studies on information processing explain that we do
respond positively when complex information is presented in a neat and
orderly form.
This article proceeds in three parts. Offering both explanation and
critique, section I provides an overview of classical legal-thought
structures, explains the infrastructural role this type of thinking plays in
U.S. legal culture, and considers the potential for injustice when classical
legal-thought structures are used uncritically. This section also draws
upon the work of cognitive scientists to explain how classical legal thought
patterns do not accurately represent how we really think.
Drawing upon a different area of cognitive science, section II
theorizes why law’s ancient thought structures have remained unchanged
for thousands of years. Although they do not mirror how we really think,
these reasoning forms are resilient because they provide an optimal
structure for the retention and understanding of complex information.
Finally, from a professional development perspective, section III explains
why critical category skills are necessary for effective legal advocacy and
then offers examples designed to engender a critical and empathic understanding of how categories work in a practical legal context.

II. Old-School Rhetoric
Old-School Rhetoric, in the context of this article, refers to three
concepts—(a) the format of the argument, (b) the so-called “classical” view

4 See infra notes 74–90 and 98–144 and accompanying text.
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of categories,5 and (c) the deployment of categories in a deductivereasoning structure, i.e., the syllogism. Because these thought structures
have been in legal culture for thousands of years, we might think of them
as forming an infrastructure for legal reasoning. However, as is often the
case with infrastructure, we do not see it, we take it for granted, and we do
not stop to critically consider its role.
A. The Enduring Format of Legal Argument
The structure of the legal argument, as we know it today, first
emerged two thousand years ago during the Greek Empire. In 466 B.C., on
the island of Syracuse, citizens seeking to reclaim property that had been
seized by an autocratic ruler sought advice from rhetoric expert Corax,
who advised them to structure their arguments with an introduction,
narration (statement of facts), argument (both for and anticipation of
counterarguments), and a peroration (conclusion).6
This argument structure remained in place into the Roman Empire,
except that by this time, two new components had been added: (1) the
partition (or argument summary)7 and (2) Cicero’s contribution, an introduction framed as a series of questions, which we now refer to as the
question presented.8 Roman rhetoric expert Quintilian posited that the
purpose of the question-based introduction was to prime the “audience in
such a way that they will be disposed to lend a ready ear to the rest of our
speech.”9 Hundreds of years later, Quintilian’s perspective has not
changed; modern legal writers are encouraged to state the issue “in a way
that supports [the] theory of the case. . .[and] suggests the [desired]
outcome.”10 As Temple Law Professor Kathryn Stanchi compellingly
points out, modern cognitive science supports Quintilian’s advice. We
know that audiences respond much more favorably when the advocate
makes a strong first impression with a persuasive framing of the
argument.11
5 The classical view of categories holds that categories are simple and easy, based on easily observable, shared properties.
GEORGE L AKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND 6 (1987); see
also infra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
6 EDWARD P.J. CORBETT & ROBERT J. CONNORS, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN STUDENT 490 (4th ed. Oxford
Univ. Press 1999); KRISTEN KONRAD ROBBINS-TISCIONE, RHETORIC FOR LEGAL WRITERS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
ANALYSIS AND PERSUASION 10 (2009). See also Michael Frost, Introduction to Classical Legal Rhetoric: A Lost Heritage, 8 S.
CAL . INTERDISC. L.J. 613, 616 (2013); Michael Frost, Brief Rhetoric—A Note on Classical and Modern Theories of Forensic
Discourse, 38 U. K AN. L. REV. 411, 411 (1989–1990) [hereinafter Frost, Brief Rhetoric] (all citing EDWARD P.J. CORBETT &
ROBERT J. CONNORS, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN STUDENT 595 (2d ed. 1971)).
7 Frost, Brief Rhetoric, supra note 6, at 413.
8 Id. at 414–15.
9 Id. at 415 (quoting 2 QUINTILIAN, INSTITUTIO ORATORIA 9 (H. Butler trans. 1921).
10 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER , MAKING YOUR CASE: THE ART OF PERSUADING JUDGES 83 (2008).
11 Kathryn M. Stanchi, The Power of Priming in Legal Advocacy: Using the Science of First Impressions to Persuade the
Reader, 89 OR . L. REV. 305, 307–12 (2010).
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Moreover, cognitive science explains how this classic framework
optimizes the reader’s processing of the argument. We know that readers
are in the best position to engage with written material when the writer
first provides an overview of the material.12 The classic format of the legal
argument does this—with the questions presented and summary of the
argument coming before the substantive portions of the argument.
Beyond the basic format for the legal argument, parts of which align with
modern cognitive science, this article primarily focuses on how and why
the basic substantive structure of legal argument, especially its logocentric
emphasis, has not changed over thousands of years.
B. The Enduring Structure of Legal Argument
By “structure of the legal argument,” I mean categories deployed in a
syllogistic form to produce arguments about how the rule applies in a
given factual situation. This deductive structure is the bedrock of legal
reasoning, and, like the format for legal reasoning, it has been around
since ancient times. This section of the article provides a historical and
jurisprudential background for the concepts that undergird the classic
structure of the legal argument—how categories fit into the syllogistic
structure of legal reasoning, which then forms the infrastructure of our
legal system.
1. Categories

Because the world is made up of so much information, we need categories to help us make sense of it. Categories allow us to obtain “a great
deal of information about the environment while conserving finite
[cognitive] resources as much as possible.”13 Thus, categories and categorization serve a useful function:
Every living being categorizes. Even the amoeba categorizes the things it
encounters into food and nonfood, what it moves toward or moves away
from. The amoeba cannot choose whether to categorize; it just does. The
same is true at every level of the animal world.14

12 See Catherine J. Cameron & Lance N. Long, The Science Behind the Art of Legal Writing 79–81 (2015) (citing David P.
Ausubel, The Use of Advance Organizers in the Learning and Retention of Meaningful Verbal Material, 51 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL.
267, 272 (1960); John Luiten et al., The Advance Organizer: A Review of Research Using Glass’s Technique of Meta-Analysis
(April 1979), available at http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED171803.pdf.
13 Eleanor Rosch, Principles of Categorization, in COGNITION AND C ATEGORIzATION 27, 28 (Eleanor Rosch & Barbara
Lloyd eds., 1978).
14 GEORGE L AKOFF & M ARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE E MBODIED MIND AND ITS C HALLENGE TO
WESTERN THOUGHT 17 (1999).
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Long ago, humans categorized to quickly determine if a thing was
good or bad—whether we could eat a thing or whether that thing might
eat us. The issue relevant to this article is that how we think we categorize
markedly differs from how our brains actually categorize information.
Nonetheless, the inaccurate “how we think we think” has become
imprinted in our legal culture. In order to understand this point, we need
to consider how classical Western philosophers conceptualized categories
and categorical thinking.
a. The Classical View of Categories—How We Think We Think
Plato and Aristotle’s approach toward “essences” provides the foundation for understanding the integral role that categories play in the classic
structure of the legal argument. Plato’s theory of essences holds that if
something is an “essence,” it shares “some thing” with all other essences of
that form.15 Plato believed that the philosopher’s task was to discern the
essences that underlie all forms of things in the world.16 Aristotle also
believed in Plato’s theory of essences, seeing “each thing as having an
essence that makes it the kind of thing it is.”17 Whereas Plato believed that
essences were ideas constructed in the mind, Aristotle believed the
opposite, that essences were things that exist in the material world.18 Thus,
the concept of essences fits into our modern concept of what a category is.
For Aristotle, analytic thinking required one to capture the rational
structure of the world, correctly categorize (identify the essence of ) the
things existing in the world, and then insert those categories into the
structure of a syllogism: All men are mortal, Socrates is a man, Socrates is
mortal. For Aristotle, the syllogism is the structure that produces new
causal knowledge.19 The principles of bivalence, transitivity, and disembodied rational thought are integral to Aristotle’s conception of how
categories function in the deductive reasoning process.
The concept of bivalence correlates with the modern concept of
mutual exclusivity. For Aristotle, it was not possible for the same attribute
to both belong and not belong to something in the same category.20 It was
not possible for Socrates to be both a man and a god, to be both mortal
and immortal. The principle of transitivity holds that if two things are

15 Id. at 365.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 373.
18 Id. at 374.
19 Aristotle, 1 Posterior Analytics, Chapter 2 (G.R.G. Mure trans.), available at http://www.logoslibrary.org/aristotle
/posterior/102.html.
20 LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 375.
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identical to a third, then they must be identical to each other.21 Implicit
within the principle of transitivity is the equality of category members; if
two things are members of one category, those two things are similarly
situated. All men are the same, in that they are all mortal. Finally, in terms
of modes of persuasion, Aristotle referred to syllogistic reasoning as
“logos,” a mode of thought appealing to logic and reason.22 Logos was
conceptualized as being rational, as being disconnected from emotion and
from the body.23
Aristotle’s understanding of categories, what cognitive scientist
George Lakoff refers to as the “classical view of categories,” soon
dominated all forms of Western thought.24 The classical view conceives of
categories as “well understood and unproblematic[,] . . . assumed to be
abstract containers, with things either inside or outside the category.”25
b. Cognitive Science and Categorization—How We Really Think
For myriad reasons, the classical view of categories does not align
with how humans actually categorize information.26 Instead of neat boxes,
categories take on a blurry, circular shape. Moreover, we do not make
category choices using an objective process that employs abstract and
disembodied thoughts. Our actual process of categorization is embodied,
unconscious, subjective, and dependent on cultural and social context.
First, we do not actually formulate categories in clean boxes with
everything in the box carrying equal weight. Rather, we construct categories that have a blurry, circular shape. Further, the things that reside
within the category may have varying degrees of category membership. In
the 1970s, cognitive scientist Eleanor Rosch instructed study subjects to
make judgments about categories, which she then visually mapped out
based on the data collected. Rosch’s groundbreaking research demonstrated that categories are not symmetrical boxes, but instead take the
form of a “radial” shape.”27 That is, some members of a category exist in a
centralized location, being the best, or prototypical examples of the

21 See POSNER, supra note 2, at 41.
22 Robbins-Tiscione, supra note 6, at 18, 101. In addition to logos, Aristotle also identified pathos (the appeal to emotion)
and ethos (the credibility of the speaker) as modes of persuasion.
23 Mark L. Johnson, Mind, Metaphor, Law, 58 MERCER L. REV. 845, 846–47 (2007) (explaining that the classical theory of
categories derives from a disembodied view of the mind); L AKOFF, supra note 5, at 8 (“The [classical] view of reason
[conceives of the process as] the disembodied manipulation of abstract symbols . . . .”).
24 L AKOFF, supra note 5, at 6 (describing how the classical view of categories soon became “part of the background
assumptions taken for granted in most scholarly disciplines” and taught as “an unquestionable, definitional truth”).
25 Id.
26 Id. at 8.
27 Eleanor Rosch, Cognitive Reference Points, 7 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 532, 544–46 (1975) (discussed in LAKOFF, supra note
5, at 45, 83–84, and Johnson, supra note 23, at 848–49); Rosch, supra note 13, at 35–36.
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category, while other less “good” category members are situated closer
toward the category’s outer boundary.28 For instance, with the category of
“bird,” a robin would be situated in the middle of the category structure,
but a penguin would be located close to the category’s border.29 The radial
structure of categories casts doubt on two classical premises: (1) that categories are shaped as symmetrical boxes and (2) that all things in a
categorical box are similarly situated (implicit within the principle of transitivity).
Second, we do not construct categories exclusively in our minds,
separate from our bodies. Rather, our category choices are informed by
how our bodies interact with the world.30 For example, when we look at a
chair, neural pathways of our brain responsible for object identification
light up and tell us we are seeing a chair.31 In addition, the parts of our
brain that control the motor functions that we use to interact with a chair
(such as sitting in a chair, moving a chair) are activated.32 Thus, the
classical belief that humans categorize apart from the body is also at odds
with cognitive science.33
Third, because categorization often happens unconsciously and automatically, the classical belief that we make categorical decisions
consciously and rationally is also out of sync with how we actually think.34
We do not have full conscious agency over our category-making process.
“Even when we think we are deliberately forming new categories, our
unconscious categories enter into our choice of possible conscious categories.”35
Fourth, the classical view that categorical decisions represent an
objective truth about the material world is false. Rather, a category is often
based on subjective choices that are products of one’s culture and individual experiences. As George Lakoff writes, “the choice of category
center and the choices of particular extensions do not have any correlates
in objective reality.”36 Different cultures have vastly different schemes for
categorizing information. For instance, speakers of the Australian

28 Rosch, supra note 13, at 35–36.
29 LAKOFF, supra note 5, at 41, 45 (discussing Rosch’s theories).
30 Id. at 18.
31 See Brett Ingram, Critical Rhetoric in the Age of Neuroscience 10–11 (2013) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Massachusetts–Amherst) available at http://scholarworks.umass.edu/open_access_dissertations/690/.
32 Id.; see also L AKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 27–28 (explaining that, when a chair is perceived, the brain’s sensorimotor system for interacting with a chair activates).
33 LAKOFF & JOHNSON supra note 14, at 4 (explaining that the notion of Cartesian dualism—that the mind is separate from
the body—is false).
34 Id. at 13.
35 Id. at 18.
36 LAKOFF, supra note 5, at 205.
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aboriginal language Dyirbal have a word, “balan,” which refers to a
category that includes women, fire, and dangerous things.37 To Western
individuals, placing women, fire, and dangerous things in a single category
seems strange, indicating the very different role that the Australian
aboriginal culture plays in the construction of categorization systems.
Different individuals, looking at the same situation, will construct categories differently, depending on their own experiences and knowledge of
what they are looking at.38
Despite the disconnect between how we think we think (the classical
view) and what cognitive science tells us about how we really think, the
classical view of categories persists in Western culture because, at the
“basic level,”39 our intuitive understandings of categories do accurately
capture some truth about the material world. Because a basic category
object like a chair raises the mental concept of a chair so easily, humans
generated the belief that categories are based on easily observable, shared
properties. Moreover, the automaticity of most of our categorizations
supports the belief that “we just categorize things as they are, that things
come in natural kinds, and that our categories of mind naturally fit the
kinds of things there are in the world.”40 As it turns out, the classical
theory of categories has heavily influenced U.S. legal culture, so much so
that a classically influenced view of legal categories can be considered to
form the infrastructure of our law.
2. The Infrastructure of Law: Logocentric Categories and Categorical
Thinking

The classical view of categories has both inspired and driven law and
legal culture in the U.S. To understand this, one must understand the law
as a science movement, in which scientific thought came to pervade legal
thinking, just as formal legal education was emerging in the U.S. While
using categories to put everything in the world in its place can be traced
back to Aristotle, the scientific revolution, in full throttle in the 1700s and
1800s, breathed new life into information organizing.41

37 Id. at 5.
38 Id. at 129.
39 A chair is a thing that exists as a basic-level category. Basic-level categories are easy to perceive in terms of their whole
shape (or gestalt); share a specific method of human/body interaction (such as how we interact with a desk chair); easily allow
mental images of them to be formed. LAKOFF, supra note 5, at 49; see also Rosch, supra note 13, at 30 (noting that the basic
level is “the most inclusive (abstract) level at which the categories can mirror the structure of attributes perceived in the
world”). On the other hand, “furniture” would not exist as a basic-level category. LAKOFF, supra note 5, at 52.
40 LAKOFF, supra note 5, at 6.
41 See generally, MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS 125–32 (Vintage Books ed. 1995) (describing how, beginning
in the enlightenment and continuing through the 19th century, scientists began devoting significant energy to the enterprises
of describing and categorizing animals, plants, all in an attempt to bring order to disorder).
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In the 1870s, when Harvard Law Professor Christopher Columbus
Langdell famously declared that law should be treated as a science,42 he
was merely giving voice to an important cultural touchtone of the time:
science was understood as developing a taxonomy for things and then
applying that system to generate new knowledge about the world.43 Thus,
Langdell’s law-as-science concept involved two different, but related
enterprises: (1) the project of using categories to impose an order and
structure onto the law, and (2) using those categories to reason analytically
about the law, usually in a syllogistic form. These two endeavors form the
basis for the jurisprudential genre known as legal formalism.44 This
section will address the history of legal categories in the United States (§ a)
and will explain how the level of depth and criticality of categorical
reasoning affects legal decisions (§ b) and how categories interact with
legal formalism, which foregrounds the use of syllogistic structures (§ c).
Finally, in (§ d), it introduces the theory that the formalist approach to
categories remains entrenched in legal culture because it allows lawyers to
present complicated information in a simplified form, which, according to
information-processing theory, produces optimal results for retention and
understanding.
a. The Emergence of Legal Categories
The foundation for the law as a science model revolved around the
organization of legal information, an endeavor based on the belief that
there is a place for everything, and everything would be in its place when
sufficiently understood. The causal agent for this organization was either
God or nature, and man merely needed to understand the whole of the
system to work harmoniously in it. Thus, the system of laws, like systems
of biology and geology, could be catalogued once all of the laws were
discovered.45

42 CHRISTOPHER COLUMBUS LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS vi (1871) (cited in Stephen
Paskey, The Law is Made of Stories: Erasing the False Dichotomy Between Stories and Legal Rules, 11 L EGAL C OMM. &
RHETORIC: JALWD 51, 51 (2014)); see also Steve Sheppard, Casebooks, Commentaries, and Curmudgeons: An Introductory
History of Law in the Lecture Hall, 82 IOWA L. REV. 548, 597 n. 276 (1996–1997) (“Langdell’s most specific recorded consideration of law as science are brief remarks delivered in an after-dinner speech.” (citing Christopher C. Langdell, Teaching Law
as a Science, 21 AM. L. REV. 123 (1887))).
43 See Sheppard, supra note 42, at 583 (discussing parallels between attempts to organize the law and Swedish Scientist Karl
Linnaeus’s plant classification template).
44 See JEAN STEFANCIC & R ICHARD DELGADO, HOW L AWYERS LOSE THEIR WAY: A PROFESSION FAILS ITS C REATIVE
MINDS 36 (2005) (explaining that, with formalism, a student or lawyer organizes the law into a coherent, ordered system of
rules and principles that can be scientifically applied to solve legal problems).
45 Sheppard, supra note 42, at 583.
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The project of constructing categories to bring order to the law’s
chaos has deeply impacted our legal system in ways we do not often
consider.46 How did the categories we have in law come to be?
Langdell was not the first legal thinker to attempt to impose a
scientific order on the law; by the time of Langdell, the idea of law as a
science was centuries old.47 Indeed, legal historian Steve Sheppard points
out that the quest to organize the law can be traced back to 1758, when
Blackstone “set out to deliver . . . a complete set of lectures” that would
support viewing the law as a “‘science . . . to be cultivated, methodized, and
explained’” in order to construct English law into a “‘species of
knowledge.’”48
Deeply influenced by Blackstone, early American law professors
began the project of organizing U.S. law. In 1774, at the Litchfield Law
School, Judge Tapping Reeve presented U.S. law in 48 different categories
including master and servant, actions for debt, evidence, trials, insurance,
partnership, etc.49 In 1790, Professor James Wilson at the College of
Philadelphia (the precursor to the University of Pennsylvania) also
attempted to organize the law in a scientific fashion, organizing his
lectures into several categories—“law and obligation, the law of nature, the
law of nations, municipal law, man as a member of a community and a
state . . . , the common law in general, evidence, corporations, judicial
procedure, and property.”50 In 1826, James Kent published his Blackstoneinspired Commentaries on American Law, which contained categories
such as “the law of nations, United States government, municipal law,
personal rights, personal property, and real property.”51
In 1829, while serving as the Dane Professor at Harvard Law School—
concomitantly with his tenure on the Supreme Court—, Justice Joseph
Story also applied scientific organizational principles to the law, creating
legal categories for “bailments, constitutional law, conflicts of law, equity
principles, equity pleadings, agency, partnership, and bills and notes.”52

46 GEOFFREY C. BOWKER & SUSAN LEIGH STAR , SORTING THINGS OUT 3 (1999) (explaining that for the most part, we do
not stop to consider the impact of categorical decisions on society and our daily life).
47 Sheppard, supra note 42, at 597.
48 Id. at 560 (quoting William Blackstone, A Discourse on the Study of Law (1758) in 1 W ILLIAM BLACKSTONE ,
COMMENTARIES ON THE L AWS OF ENGLAND (1765–69 facsimile edition, Univ. of Chicago Press 1979); see also Catharine
Pierce Wells, Langdell and the Invention of Legal Doctrine, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 551, 555–56 (2010) (Blackstone’s Commentaries
were so influential because of the structure they imposed on British law); Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and the World of
Thinkable Thoughts, 2 J. APP. PRAC . & PROCESS 305, 308 (2000) (“Blackstone took a messy smorgasbord of common law
doctrine and practice and organized it into a comprehensible series of propositions.”).
49 Sheppard, supra note 42, at 564–65.
50 Id. at 570 (citing James Wilson, Of the Study of the Law in the United States, in BIRD W ILSON, THE WORKS OF THE
HONOURABLE JAMES WILSON, L.L.D. xv–xvi (Philadelphia, Lorenzo Press 1804).
51 Id. at 574 (citing JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (New York, O. Halsted 1826–1830).
52 Id. at 575–76.

OLD-SCHOOL RHETORIC AND NEW-SCHOOL COGNITIVE SCIENCE

49

Finally, in the 1870s, Langdell strove to impose a better order and
structure on contract law, creating a new category, contract formation,
which contained two subcategories, offer and acceptance.53 Thus, it is
perhaps unfair to hold Langdell solely accountable for the law as a science
theory when he did not originate the concept.54
Established legal categories became even more imbricated into our
legal system when, in the late 1800s, the West Publishing company (now
Westlaw) created the American Digest System, which set out to produce
“a subject classification system that purport[ed] to describe every possible
legal situation that can exist.”55 U.C. Berkeley law librarian Robert C.
Berring observes,
A quick look at the seven major divisions of the American Digest System
shows that they are closely related to Langdell’s vision of the law, and,
hence, to Blackstone’s vision of the law. The breakdowns of key numbers
within the topics also correspond to the language and concepts of
Blackstone.56

Westlaw’s American Digest System still controls much legal information today. As legal-research teachers have taught students for years, in
researching the law on the Westlaw website, the most efficient way to
locate legal information is to access the Key Number system.
Obviously, legal categories are helpful devices.57 Without some
method of organizing the law into categories and subcategories, lawyers
would be forever lost in a bramble bush58 of information anarchy.59 But the
history of our legal categories has led not only to necessary organization,
but to shaping legal meanings. When we think about U.S. law as information, categories form a part of law’s infrastructure.60 The thing about
infrastructure, however, is that it is invisible; we do not see it unless it
breaks.61 The invisibility of infrastructure can obscure the fact that cate-

53 Wells, supra note 48, at 566.
54 See id. at 552 (explaining that contemporary legal writers have often treated Langdell as a straw man).
55 Berring, supra note 48, at 309.
56 Id.; see also Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and Legal Concepts: Where Form Molds Substance, 75 C AL . L. REV. 15,
24–25 (1987).
57 See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 16–17 (2d ed. 1970) (“No natural history can be
interpreted in the absence of at least some implicit body of intertwined theoretical and methodological belief that permits
selection, evaluation, and criticism.”).
58 KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (Oxford Univ. Press 2008).
59 Berring, supra note 48, at 314.
60 BOWKER & STAR, supra note 46, at 2, 34 (explaining that, from an information science perspective, categories and classification systems can be understood as infrastructure).
61 Id. at 2.
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gories can valorize one point of view but silence another.62 And no single
classification scheme will be helpful for everyone—for example, red-andgreen-light traffic distinctions do not work at all for blind people and do
not work well for color-blind people.63 In law, distinctions based on old
norms (such as the historic distinctions between property and contract
law) may have worked in medieval times, but no longer work in
modernity. For instance, in the common law, property and contracts had
long been constructed as mutually exclusive categories, meaning that the
contractual concept of a warranty could not apply to real-property leases.
But with the advent of modern apartment residences, there arose a need
for warranty-like protections for tenants.64
Similarly, discriminatory legal categories based on race worked in
favor of the dominant group but not at all for those left outside at the
margins. As will be explained in more depth below, in the Plessy v.
Ferguson case, the Court accepted the argument that separate accommodations based on racial categories (white and black) did not render those
categories legally unequal. This categorical scheme benefited whites by
allowing them to maintain their social dominance—the white train car
would always be better than the black car, because it was comprised of the
individuals at the top of the racial hierarchy. When the Plessy Court
declined to engage with the social reality shaped by the law’s discriminatory racial categories, it was able to present its reasoning with a logic of
equality. But these categories—black and white, legal and social—
engendered years of Jim Crow inequality. It is an example of how
categories, carefully constructed to appear equal, work well for the group
with social dominance, but can severely oppress those with less power.65
Consistent with other forms of informational infrastructure, lawyers
often overlook the importance of legal categories.66 As legal realist Karl
Llewellyn noted,67 it is important to develop a critical view of legal categories, understand how categories can reify existing inequality, and open
up our thinking to breathe new life into legal categories, if necessary.68
Legal categories can legitimize existing power structures. For instance,
Duncan Kennedy posits that Blackstone’s categorical scheme preserved

62 Id. at 5.
63 Id. at 41.
64 See infra notes 91–97 and surrounding text.
65 See infra text accompanying notes 74–79.
66 Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone’s Commentaries, 28 BUFF. L. REV. 205, 215 (1978).
67 Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 453 1930) (arguing that legal categories should be viewed with skepticism).
68 See, e.g., infra sections B(2)(b) and B(2)(c).
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and legitimated hierarchical British institutions such as feudal, clerical,
and spousal relationships that permeated British society at the time.69
Legal categories can also constrain our thoughts. As Professors
Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic write, a search on Westlaw can easily
locate ideas related to the category that one is viewing, but “innovative
jurisprudence,” which might “require entirely new tools” can easily remain
“undeveloped.”70 In this way, existing legal categories “function like
eyeglasses that we have worn for a long time. They enable us to see better,
but conceal the possibility that we might be able to see even better with a
different pair.”71 We might think of legal categories as producing a
“common stock of ideas,” which are highly helpful, but nonetheless
constraining when it comes to searching for creative solutions to legal
problems.72
Finally, with legal categories, we tend to think they have always been
that way. But categories can and do change. For instance, as modern
apartment dwellings began to permeate American cities, the argument
that contract-type warranties could never be applied in a property context
began to fall away. Eventually, the property category evolved to include
warranty concepts like the warranty of habitability.73 As the next section
explores, the way in which categories are deployed greatly affects the
quality of legal reasoning. A fluid and critical approach to categorization
can reshape the law and move it in positive directions. However, when
categories are used rigidly and uncritically, they generate less-robust legal
reasoning and may also become a tool for reproducing injustice in the law.
b. How Categorical Reasoning Influences the Quality
of Legal Decisions
The problem with using legal categories in a rigid and decontextualized way is apparent in the harmful legal reasoning used to perpetuate
unequal racial distinctions prior to the civil war and during the Jim Crow
era. In Scott v. Sandford74 (the Dred Scott case), Chief Justice Roger Taney,
writing with logic and authority, declared that the category of “citizen”
absolutely did not and was not meant to include descendants of slaves.
Why? Because when the Constitution was drafted, humans descended

69 Kennedy, supra note 66, at 278, 280, 288, 300, 381.
70 Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Why Do We Tell The Same Stories?: Law Reform, Critical Librarianship, and the Triple
Helix Dilemma, 42 STAN. L. REV. 207, 208 (1989).
71 Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Why Do We Ask the Same Questions? The Triple Helix Dilemma Revisited, 99 L. LIBR .
J. 307, 308 (2007).
72 Id. at 310.
73 See infra text accompanying notes 91–97.
74 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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from slaves were “considered as a subordinate and inferior class of beings,
who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and . . . [accordingly], had
no rights or privileges” under the Constitution.75 Justice Taney could not
perceive how the category of citizen might be expanded to include human
beings forcibly brought into the jurisdiction of the United States to labor
in a violent regime of servitude.
Similarly, in Plessy v. Ferguson,76 two clear and distinct categories
supported the Court’s holding that separate and equal accommodations
did not offend the Constitution’s Equal Protection clause. In the majority
opinion, Justice Henry Billings Brown constructed a category—political
equality—that the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to protect.77 But
then Justice Brown categorized the rights of blacks to sit in the same train
car with whites as social equality. However, Justice Brown placed social
equality well outside the walls of the legally protectable political-equality
category, reasoning that laws requiring social separation did not necessarily imply the inferiority of one class over the other.78 Thus, two rigid
categories—political equality and social equality—were used to perpetuate
the toxic de jure discrimination that afflicted the United States until the
Brown v. Board of Education Court reconstituted racial categories in a
contextual way to hold that separate schools for black children did in fact
imply that the black schools (and black school children) were inferior.79
Another issue with the classical view of categories, as applied to legal
reasoning, is that it can produce overly simplified legal analysis. This is
due in part to how we automatically categorize at the basic level. For
instance, when we see an object that occupies a category at the basic level,
such as a chair, we immediately know, without even thinking, what the
thing is and what category it is—it is a chair.80 However, the automatic way
we categorize items at this level produces a sometimes false belief that
category choices are always simple and uncomplicated. When an
uncritical approach to categories is applied to law, we sometimes end up
with reasoning that lacks robustness.
As an example of a judge’s intuitive approach to legal categories, in
1931, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes evaluated whether the relatively new
airplane fit into the category of “motor vehicle,” contained in a federal anti-

75 Id. at 404.
76 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
77 Id. at 544.
78 See id.
79 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493–95 (1954). See also STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra note 44, at 42–43 (explaining
that Brown rejected a rigid categorical approach).
80 Lakoff & Johnson, supra note 14, at 27.
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theft statute.81 The statute defined motor vehicles as including automobiles, trucks, automobile wagons, and motorcycles.82 The statute’s
residual clause then included any “self propelled vehicle not designed for
running on rails.”83
Justice Holmes held that an airplane was not a vehicle because
“‘vehicle’ calls up the picture of a thing moving on land.”84 In reaching this
decision, Justice Holmes reasoned that to provide fair notice, criminal
categories must be clear and should only include items evoked “in the
common mind,” of the category’s “popular picture,” which, in this case,
only included vehicles running on land.85
The result of this decision, that an airplane was not a motor vehicle,
was not incorrect, particularly in the context of criminal liability. However,
the legal reasoning—relying on a popular picture and what a word
generates in one’s mind—could be more rigorous. There was no consideration of the attributes of the vehicle category such as the presence of
wheels, a structure, or a mechanical ability to move from one point to
another. And there was no consideration of how many of those conditions
are actually present in an airplane. Finally, Justice Holmes accepts, without
question, that he is in a good position to evaluate what the “popular”
understanding is in the “common mind.”86
Another example of the complexity of seemingly simple categories
comes from the recent case of White City Shopping Center v. PR
Restaurants, which answered the question of whether a burrito is a
sandwich.87 In this case, a shopping center leased space to Panera Bread, a
sandwich shop. The shopping center’s lease contained an exclusivity
clause that prohibited the landlord from renting any shopping center
space to another sandwich shop. The landlord subsequently leased
shopping center space to Qdoba, a Mexican restaurant specializing in
burritos and tacos.88

81 McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931) (cited in STEVEN WINTER , A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: L AW, LIFE , AND
MIND 37 (2011)).
82 Id. at 26.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id. at 26–27.
86 Id. at 26, 27.
87 White City Shopping Ctr. v. PR Restaurants, 2006 WL 3292641, *1–2 (Sup. Ct. Mass. Oct. 31, 2006). See also Stephanie
Thompson, Introduction to Analogical Reasoning—Is a Burrito a Sandwich (unpublished teaching materials) (available on the
2008 LWI Idea Bank). Quite possibly, the burrito–sandwich problem might overtake H.L.A. Hart’s no vehicle in the park
hypotheticals the most popular legal-analysis hypothetical. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law & Morals,
71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607 (1958).
88 White City Shopping Ctr., 2006 WL 3292641, at *1–2.

54

LEGAL COMMUNICATION & RHETORIC: JALWD / VOLUME 13 / 2016

And hence, the issue presented was whether a burrito is a sandwich.
Arguments that a burrito is not a sandwich would require a fairly narrow
and traditional definition of sandwich—i.e., an item of food with filling
(meat, vegetables, etc.) in between two slices of bread. In order to argue
that a burrito is a sandwich, one must define a sandwich more broadly as
an item of food with filling (meat, vegetables, etc.), served within or on top
of a grain-based product.
The sandwich–burrito question has captivated jurists Justice Antonin
Scalia and Judge Richard Posner. Perhaps not surprisingly, Justice Scalia
aligned with an intuitive, narrow, and traditional understanding of what a
sandwich is, positing that “no reasonable speaker of English would call a . .
. burrito . . . a ‘sandwich.’”89 On the other hand, Judge Posner would
advocate a more fluid approach, arguing that a burrito could be a
sandwich, especially when one considers that an open-faced turkey
sandwich is still a sandwich.90
When legal categories are deployed in an imaginative and fluid way,
they have the capacity to transform the law, moving it in positive
directions. Javins v. First National Realty Corp. provides proof that longstanding common-law categories can change in response to changing
social conditions.91 In this case, the D.C. Circuit held that a warranty of
habitability should be implied in all leases within the District of
Columbia.92 In reaching this holding, Judge J. Skelly Wright used contract
law to give a blood transfusion to property law.93 Specifically, Judge Wright
borrowed the doctrine of implied warranties of fitness and
merchantability from contract law and applied those doctrines to
formulate an implied warranty of habitability for a lease.94 In so doing,
Judge Wright questioned and rethought the basis of the longstanding cate-

89 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER , READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TExTS 55 (2012).
90 Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin Scalia, The New Republic (Sept. 13, 2014), http://www.newrepublic.com
/article/magazine/books-and-arts/106441/scalia-garner-reading-the-law-textual-originalism. The sandwich–burrito issue
also raises interesting questions of culture and context in how legal categories are constructed. For instance, why did Justice
Scalia choose to emphasize the meaning of sandwich to a native English speaker? Are the categorization choices of individuals who did not grow up speaking English any less valid than those of native English speakers? Might we conclude that
the law’s plain meaning analysis privileges a certain kind of knowledge and understanding and excludes other perspectives?
Individuals growing up in Mexico or Latin America may very well have a different view of what a sandwich is, or is not. If the
purpose of the lease’s provision is to prevent undue competition for the Panera sandwich restaurant, why not allow an
expanded definition of sandwich to prevent the shopping center from leasing space to the burrito restaurant?
91 This example derives from Professor Tim Terrell’s thoughtful article, The Art of Legal Reasoning and the Angst of Judging:
Of Balls, Strikes, and Moments of Truth, 8 N W. J. L. & SOC . POL’ Y 35, 60–61 (2012) (discussing Javins v. First Nat’l Realty
Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970)).
92 Javins, 428 F.2d at 1072–73, 1080.
93 Id. at 1075–77.
94 Id.
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gorical distinction between property leases and contracts, which was
founded upon medieval norms.
Among many judicial opinions that have changed the law, Judge
Wright’s opinion is remarkable for its lucidity. In it, we have a clear
window into the process of how legal categories become reformed. Judge
Wright opined that “[c]ourts have a duty to reappraise old doctrines in the
light of the facts and values of contemporary life—particularly old
common-law doctrines the courts themselves created and developed.”95
Integral to Judge Wright’s reasoning was a sense that the old basis for the
property–contract distinction no longer applied to modern urban
apartment tenants, who receive little to no interest in the land that the
apartment building stands on.96 After thoroughly considering the
historical bases for the categorical distinctions, Judge Wright held that the
“common law . . . must recognize the landlord’s obligation to keep . . .
premises in a habitable condition.”97
The Javins opinion shows that critically thinking about categories can
reform the law. Although this example shows a judge rethinking categories
to move the law forward, in our adversary system, lawyers are the ones
who proffer novel category structures for judges to consider. Although
longstanding legal categories and dichotomies (like the divisions between
property and contract law or tort and contract law) seem entrenched, part
of the efficacy of our common-law system is that they can be completely
remodeled. Moreover, this case illustrates the value in bringing a sense of
imagination to legal categories. One can take doctrine from one category
and breathe new life into a different legal category. In this way, new blood
transforms aging doctrine.
c. Legal Formalism: Syllogistic Thinking as a Mode of Thought
and Culture
Although the rigid and uncritical deployment of legal categories can
produce negative outcomes, it is nonetheless a highly respected
methodology for common-law reasoning. The belief in the stable structure
of categories and their objective veracity pervades American legal culture.
Known as legal formalism, this mode of thought emphasizes the use of
rigid, dichotomous, and abstract categories to logically solve legal
problems.98 Legal formalism, in the context of this article, is aligned with

95 Id. at 1074.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 “Nineteenth-century legal thought [the era of legal
formalism] was overwhelmingly dominated by categorical

thinking—by clear, distinct, bright-line classifications of
legal phenomena.” MORTON J. H ORWITz , THE
TRANSFORMATION OF A MERICAN L AW 1870–1960: THE
C RISIS OF L EGAL ORTHODOxY 17 (Oxford 1992). The
judge’s job was “to decide whether a dispute fell within one
or another of mutually exclusive categories.” Id. at 18.
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the classical (but cognitively inaccurate) view that “[categorical] concepts
have strict, fixed boundaries defined by necessary and sufficient
conditions.”99
Legal formalism also embraces a binary and mutually exclusive
approach to categories: you either have a lawsuit or you do not; the
element is met or it is not; judgment must be either for the plaintiff or the
defendant.100 The goal of legal analysis is to “make legal reasoning seem
like mathematics.”101 The tool that allows the advocate to do this is the
syllogism.
As discussed above, symmetrical and rigid reasoning helped
perpetuate both the violent regime of slavery and the Jim Crow laws that
succeeded it. Using the rigid categories within the Dred Scott and Plessy v.
Ferguson decisions discussed above,102 we can now see how these categories are powerfully deployed in the syllogistic structure. For instance,
the Dred Scott decision is founded upon the following logical syllogism:
No person of African descent may be a citizen of the United States.
Dred Scott is of African descent.
Dred Scott cannot be a citizen of the United States.103

Implicit in the above syllogism is the conclusion that a person of
African descent fits best into the category of “property” rather than a
“person” or “people” as that word was used in the Constitution.104 The
syllogism is logical, if one accepts the categorical choices that undergird its
premises. Modeling formalism’s rigidly rationalist persona, Chief Justice
Taney cautioned that “it is not the province of the court to decide upon
the justice or injustice, the policy or impolicy, of these laws.” The same
type of faulty syllogism infects the Plessy v. Ferguson decision, which
instantiated the Jim Crow laws that would soon blanket the South. Plessy’s
majority opinion can be distilled into the following nested syllogism:

99 Johnson, supra note 23, at 847; see also note 98.
100 Winter, supra note 81, at 43–44 (citations omitted).
101 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1894).
102 See supra notes 74–79 and accompanying text.
103 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 396–97 (1856). In this case (and in Plessy v. Ferguson, infra note 105), the syllogism does
not appear as three lines, but instead, relies on the enthymeme, a rhetorical device that omits widely accepted premises from
the equation. See ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC 11, 116 (Filiquarian Publishing 2008); Cara A. Finnegal, Recognizing Lincoln, Image
Vernaculars in Nineteenth-Century Visual Culture, in VISUAL RHETORIC: A READER IN COMMUNICATION AND AMERICAN
CULTURE, 61, 63, 74 (Lester C. Olson, Cara A. Finnegan & Diane S. Hope eds., 2008).
104 60 U.S. at 404, 408.
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Only laws that destroy the legal equality between the two races are
unconstitutional.
Mere legal distinctions between white and African Americans do not
destroy legal equality. The Louisiana statute mandating separate cars for
African-American and White riders is a mere legal distinction.
The Louisiana statute is not unconstitutional.105

As with the Dred Scott case, the Plessy decision is highly logical, but
only if one accepts the categorical choices of a law that destroys legal
equality versus a law that functions merely as a legal distinction. As we will
see, although legal formalism suffered losses in twentieth century jurisprudential thought, its influence remains deeply embedded in our legal
culture.
Toward the end of the 19th-century, legal thinkers began to assault
legal formalism as hopelessly tone-deaf. In 1880, Oliver Wendell Holmes
famously quipped that “[t]he life of the law has not been logic; it has been
experience,” which painted legal formalism as old-fashioned and out of
tune with how the real world works.106 Following in the footsteps of
Holmes, the legal-realism movement continued the critique of legal
formalism, aiming to replace it with a more balanced and realistic
approach to lawmaking.107
With respect to categories, prominent legal realist Karl Llewellyn
urged lawyers to understand how categories shape legal meanings, to
understand that “to classify is to disturb.”108 For Llewellyn, categories
“build emphases, . . . create stresses, which obscure some of the data under
observation and give fictitious value to others.”109 Llewellyn urged lawyers
to take a skeptical view of the “adequacy of the received categories” for
solving legal problems.110 If an existing category does not work for a
particular legal problem, Llewellyn urged the practitioner to look at the
facts with a fresh set of eyes, outside the influence of prior categorical
decisions.111
The legal realists were successful in moving U.S. law in a different
direction. For instance, in some doctrinal areas, legal realists replaced
rigid elemental tests with balancing-factor tests.112 However, legal

105 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543 (1896). See also
STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra n. 44, at 40–41 (explaining
how the reasoning of Plessy v. Ferguson exemplifies legal
formalism).

108 Karl Llewellyn, supra note 67, at 453.

106 Wells, supra note 48, at 592.

111 Id.

107 HORWITz, supra note 98, at 18, 63, 199, 200.

112 HORWITz, supra note 98, at 18.

109 Id.
110 Id.
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formalism never died. In an influential essay penned in 1959, Harvard
Professor Herbert Wechsler argued for a return to “neutral principles” to
settle legal questions.113 Neutral principles are “reasons [that can be used
to decide] all the issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and
their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is involved.”114
Wechsler opined that neutral principles are necessary to avoid judicial bias
and subjectivity.115 Based on his neutral principles theory, Wechsler
argued that the Warren court incorrectly decided Brown v. Board of
Education,116 reasoning that it elevated the rights of African-Americans
over the associational rights of whites, who would choose not to mingle
with persons considered “unpleasant or repugnant.”117
Wechsler’s reasoning was highly formalistic, using categories to
abstract the question of segregation from its historical and factual
reality.118 Wechsler’s error was that he constructed a clean category for
“associational rights” and stopped there in his syllogistic analysis. He did
not stop to question the power relations that informed the creation of the
category. He did not perceive that “associational rights” are not a simple
set of rights, but a quite messy category that carried the broad power to
subordinate African Americans. In the effort to divide social relations into
syllogistic clean categories, Wechsler ignored the reality of Jim Crow
violence and inequality.119
Wechsler’s theory of neutrality greatly influenced U.S. judicial and
legal culture, and continues to shape jurisprudential theory today.120 After
Wechsler’s article was published, legal theorists continued the argument,
with one side advocating for a strictly neutral approach121 and the other
for a more fluid and contextualized method approach.122 Beginning in the

113 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1 (1959).
114 Id. at 19.
115 Id. at 1, 9, 12.
116 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
117 Wechsler, supra note 113, at 34.
118 HORWITz, supra note 98, at 268 (“In its un-historical abstractness, neutral principles analysis combines with ethical
positivism to produce a new conservative formulation in Orthodox legal thought”); RICHARD A. POSNER , OVERCOMING
LAW 73–75 (1995) (describing Wechsler’s analysis as “formalist,” based on “abstract concepts . . . , arguments from logic, and
hypothetical cases”).
119 See STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra note 44, at 43 (“Wechsler’s error demonstrates how little one can achieve by logic and
syllogistic reasoning alone.”).
120 See Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some
Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (2010).
121 Id. at 5 nn.13, 16 (citing Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term—Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV.
L. REV. 40, 77 (1961); ROBERT H. B ORK , THE TEMPTING OF A MERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE L AW 143–86
(1990); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 1–4, 17 (1971); Antonin
Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).

OLD-SCHOOL RHETORIC AND NEW-SCHOOL COGNITIVE SCIENCE

59

1970s, the critical-legal-studies movement raised new doubts about legal
formalism, specifically engaging with the hidden ways that power shapes
legal categories.123 Out of the critical-legal-studies movement came
critical-feminist theory, critical-queer theory, and critical-race theory, all
of which posed strenuous questions about the formation and composition
of long held legal categories.124
Although legal formalism is no longer the only available mode of
jurisprudential thought, it remains firmly embedded in U.S. legal culture.
In legal education, we see legal formalism in the nearly universal “IRAC”
analytic template.125 Langdell’s Socratic method, still the dominant educational method in law school, relies heavily on formalist principles.126
When linguistic expert Elizabeth Mertz conducted an ethnographic study
of legal education, she concluded that legal training inculcates a formalist
mode of thinking about legal questions that “forces students’ attention
away from a systematic or comprehensive consideration of social context
and specificity.”127 “Instead, students are urged to pay attention to more
abstract categories of legal (rather than social) contexts, reflecting a quite
particular, culturally driven model of justice.”128
Legal formalism also thrives in the minds of judges. Formalism’s
conception of rationality appears when judges insist that their job is to
merely call “balls and strikes”129 rather than decide cases in the “messy
world of empirical reality.”130 Justice Scalia notes that “[g]ood judges pride
themselves on the rationality of their rulings and the suppression of their
personal proclivities, including most especially their emotions.”131 Most
would agree that in the last thirty years, Supreme Court jurisprudence has

122 Id. at 4–5 nn.14–15 (citing JOHN H ART E LY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 73–103 (1981); RONALD DWORKIN,
FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996)).
123 LINDA H. EDWARDS, LEGAL WRITING AND ANALYSIS 240–41 (3d ed. 2011); STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra note 44, at
37–38 (explaining that the critical legal studies movement is the philosophical descendant of the legal realist movement). See
generally ROBERTO M ANGABEIRA UNGER , KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); DUNCAN KENNEDY, LEGAL EDUCATION
AND THE REPRODUCTION OF HIERARCHY: A POLEMIC AGAINST THE SYSTEM (2007); Kennedy, supra note 66.
124 See EDWARDS, supra note 123, at 240–41; STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra note 44, at 37–38.
125 The IRAC structure follows the structure of the syllogism. The R is the major premise, the A is the minor premise, and
the C is the conclusion.
126 STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra note 44, at 38; see also E LIzABETH MERTz , THE L ANGUAGE OF L AW S CHOOL :
LEARNING TO “THINK LIKE A LAWYER” (2007).
127 Mertz, supra note 126, at 5.
128 Id.
129 Terrell, supra note 91, at 37 (citing Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr., yo Be Chief Justice
of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 186 (2005) (questioning by Senator Joe
Biden)).
130 POSNER, supra note 118, at 74.
131 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 10, at 32.
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moved away from expanding rights and more toward limited decisions,
grounded in formalistic principles.132
Moreover, for judges and lawyers, the syllogism remains the “sine qua
non of legal analysis.”133 Judge Posner opines that “so compelling and
familiar is syllogistic reasoning that lawyers and judges, ever desirous of
making their activity seem as objective as possible, try hard to make legal
reasoning seem as syllogistic as possible.”134 Justice Scalia and legal writing
guru Bryan Garner advise that the best legal reasoning takes the following
form:
Given a rule of law that [those] conditions generically described as A
produce a certain legal liability or other consequence x, does the specific
fact or group of facts n fall within the genus A?
You read an authoritative legal text to discover A (a major premise). You
find facts to discover n (the minor premise). Then you draw your
conclusion. 135

It seems that the goal articulated by Oliver Wendell Holmes—“to
make legal reasoning seem like mathematics”136—has not changed much.
And so, the ancient syllogism and the conception of reason as disembodied endures in our legal culture.
Nonetheless, legal formalism’s cultural resilience continues to inspire
critiques. James Boyd White writes that formalism misrecognizes the
nature of law itself: “The law is not an abstract system or scheme of rules,
as we often speak of it, but an inherently unstable structure of thought and
expression.”137 In addressing why lawyers are markedly unhappier than
members of other professions, critical scholars Richard Delgado and Jean
Stefancic argue that legal formalism might be a causal factor, because it
takes “the life out of work and the professions, depriving them of juice,
richness, concreteness, and anything else that might render them of
human interest.”138 Judge Richard Posner, who rejects legal formalism in
favor of practical reason, a more worldly mode of analysis, 139 derides legal
formalism as the ineffective thought patterns of an out of touch “failed law
professor.”140

132 See STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra note 44, at 38
(explaining that after the Warren court, the Supreme Court
has moved toward a more formalist model of
jurisprudence).
133 ROBBINS-TISCIONE, supra note 6, at 150.
134 POSNER, supra note 2, at 39.
135 Scalia & Garner, supra note 89, at 54.
136 See supra note 101.

137 James Boyd White, An Old-Fashioned View of the
Nature of Law, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 381, 381
(2011).
138 STEFANCIC & DELGADO, supra note 44, at xi.
139 Practical reason requires “setting a goal—pleasure, the
good life, whatever—and choosing the means best suited to
reaching it.” POSNER, supra note 2, at 71.
140 POSNER, supra note 118, at 76.
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As discussed more fully above, the classical view of categories, which
legal formalism adopts, is cognitively inaccurate.141 Categories are not
“fixed, stable, [with an] objective structure.”142 Cognitive science tells us
that categories are structured in a messy, fluid, radial, and arbitrary way.143
Moreover, Professor Johnson reminds us that what a thing is, or is not,
depends on the “values held by the people who get to decide the issue”—
that is, the people with the power to construct categories.144
d. Why is Legal Formalism Not Dead?
As the foregoing shows, the classical conception of reason and categories, embraced by legal formalism, does not match with how we think or
with how the world really works. Moreover, legal formalism is responsible
for terrible things—great injustice and possibly deep unhappiness.145
Nonetheless, formalist reasoning, especially the syllogism, remains firmly
ensconced in legal culture, heralded as the best way to present information. SUNY Buffalo Professor James Gardner writes that “[w]hen
presented with the properly framed major and minor premises of a
syllogism, the human mind seems to produce the conclusion without any
additional prompting.”146 Further, “to deny the syllogism’s conclusion is to
deny the world itself as we understand it.”147
So why is the syllogism, with its neat and clean categories, so
powerful? What makes these ancient thought structures so resilient? The
answer comes from a different corner of cognitive science, that part of the
discipline that focuses on how humans process information. As set forth
below, ample studies indicate that the human mind responds positively
when information is presented clearly and neatly. So, even though
formalist reasoning comes with deep faults,148 its symmetry and structure
help audiences engage with and make sense of law’s complexity.

141 See supra notes 26– 40 and accompanying text.
142 Johnson, supra note 23, at 848.
143 Id. at 851.
144 Id. at 849.
145 See supra notes 103–19 and 137–40 and accompanying text.
146 JAMES A. GARDNER , LEGAL ARGUMENT: THE STRUCTURE AND LANGUAGE OF EFFECTIVE ADVOCACY 5 (2d ed. 2007).
147 Id.
148 Formalistic reasoning does not always produce negative results. There are occasions when it has been deployed to
reshape categories and correct longstanding injustice. One powerful example can be seen in Brown v. Board of Education,
where appellants skillfully deployed syllogistic reasoning to successfully argue that public-school segregation violated the
Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., infra notes 232–34 and accompanying text.
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III. Cognitive Science Approaches
to Information Processing
With respect to arguments, Judge Posner intuits that symmetry and
simplicity make an argument more persuasive, convincing the reader that
“[t]hat’s how it must be.”149 Posner’s intuition is spot on, in terms of what
we know about how humans process information. Studies on humaninformation processing indicate that clean categories deployed in a
syllogistic structure make it easier for human minds to engage with legal
information. In the context of cognitive approaches to categorization, the
human need for order and structure appears in the universal desire to
make a “theory of everything.”150 We assume that there is a single right
taxonomy of things, in part because of the ease with which we can assign
categories to basic objects—like cats, dogs, chairs, and tables.151
The attractiveness of order and structure also makes sense from an
evolutionary perspective. To avoid information overload in an overwhelmingly complex world, humans attempt to structure the world in a
more “simplified, more manageable form.”152 In perceiving information,
humans naturally default to the most simple, regular, and symmetrical
form that is helpful for perceiving stimuli.153 In the context of information
processing, the principles of cognitive load, fluency, and chunking explain
how and why clean-cut legal reasoning is so effective.
A. Cognitive Load and Working-Memory Theory
Where the goal is to persuade, presenting information in an easily
digestible form carries many benefits. In Volume 11 of this journal,
Arizona State law professor Andrew Carter lucidly describes both
cognitive load and working-memory theory. Professor Carter explains that
readers have limited resources when it comes to the ability to process
information.154 Cognitive load refers to the amount of information that the
mind must hold, but also includes how each piece of information relates to
another.155 In terms of the number of informational items that the brain

149 POSNER, supra note 2, at 149–50 (quoting LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY 92 (G.E.M. Anscombe & G. H. von
Wright eds., 1969).
150 LAKOFF & JOHNSON, supra note 14, at 348.
151 LAKOFF, supra note 5, at 119.
152 Steven L. Neuberg & Jason T. Newsom, Personal Need for Structure: Individual Differences in the Desire for Simple
Structure, 65 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 113, 113 (1993).
153 ANNE M ARIE SEWARD B ARRY, V ISUAL INTELLIGENCE , PERCEPTION, IMAGE , AND M ANIPULATION IN V ISUAL
COMMUNICATION 47 (1997).
154 Andrew M. Carter, The Reader’s Limited Capacity: A Working Memory Theory for Legal Writers, 11 LEGAL COMM. &
RHETORIC 31, 41 (2014).
155 Id. at 42 (citing JOHN SWELLER , PAUL AYRES & SLAVA KALYUGA , COGNITIVE LOAD THEORY 57–58 (2011)).
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can hold, we know that humans have a general capacity to remember and
engage with about seven different concepts.156 Related to cognitive load is
working memory, which refers to the type of brainpower that we draw
upon when reading and analyzing text.
Working memory “refers to the ability to actively maintain task goals
in the face of interference and distraction and to selectively retrieve goal
relevant information from long-term memory.”157 In the context of
reading, if working memory is taxed too much, the mind will wander.158
Obviously, if the goal is to persuade our reader about a complex legal issue,
we do not want the reader’s mind to be wandering as they consider our
points. Hence, the goal for legal writers is to present information in a way
that draws upon the least amount of working memory, requiring the least
amount of cognitive load.159
One way to reduce cognitive load is to present information so that it
can be processed automatically, which draws upon less working memory.
160 Relevant here is the concept of system 1 and system 2 processing. In the
mind, system 1 processing is “automatic, effortless and in parallel.”161 On
the other hand, system 2 is more analytical, and requires more workingmemory sources.162 Automatic processing occurs within system 1; system
2 requires more mental energy.163 Automatic processing is engendered
when complex pieces of information are “chunked” together and when the
text is presented fluently.
1. Chunking

One can increase the number of items that the mind can remember
by “chunking” those items together.164 Chunking involves a process of
“recoding,” which has the mind “group the input events, apply a new name
to the group, and then remember the new name rather than the original

156 George A. Miller, The Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing
Information, 63 PSYCHOL. REV. 81 (1956), reprinted in 101 PSYCHOL. REV. 343, 348–49 (1994).
157 Nash Unsworth & Brittany D. McMillan, Mind Wandering and Reading Comprehension: Examining the Roles of Working
Memory Capacity, Interest, Motivation, and Topic Experience, 39 J. ExPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 832, 832 (2013).
158 Id. at 838.
159 Carter, supra note 154, at 41, 44.
160 Nadine Marcus, Martin Cooper & John Sweller, Understanding Instructions, 88 J. OF EDUC. PSYCHOL. 49, 49 (1996); K.
Kotovsky, J.R. Hayes & H.A. Simon, Why Are Some Problems Hard? Evidence from Tower of Hanoi, 17 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL.
248, 292 (1985).
161 Daniel M. Oppenheimer, The Secret Life of Fluency, 12 TRENDS IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE 237, 239 (2008) [hereinafter
Oppenheimer, The Secret Life of Fluency]; see also Adam L. Alter, Daniel Oppenheimer, Nicholas Epley & Rebecca Eyre,
Overcoming Intuition: Metacognitive Difficulty Activates Analytic Reasoning, 136 J. ExPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 569, 569 (2007)
[hereinafter Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley & Eyre, Overcoming Intuition].
162 Oppenheimer, The Secret Life of Fluency, supra note 161, at 239.
163 Id.
164 Miller, supra note 156, at 349.
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input events.”165 Recoding is an “extremely powerful weapon for increasing
the amount of information that we can deal with.”166
A writer can chunk by stringing together words, which can function
as chunks.167 Nobel Laureate Hebert Simon explains that a chunk of
material “is a particular amount [of information] that has specific psychological significance.”168 Simon asks if we can remember these nine words:
“Lincoln, milky, criminal, differential, address, way, lawyer, calculus,
Gettysburg.”169 Now, try to remember “Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address,
Milky Way, Criminal Lawyer, and Differential Calculus.”170 As the exercise
illustrates, it becomes much easier to remember these words when they
are chunked.
Categories are useful units for chunking information. Incorporating
complex concepts into a simpler category allows the information to be
processed automatically, leading to a lessened cognitive load, which in
turn increases understanding.171 The use of abstract categories to
represent complex concepts is known as cognitive structuring.172
Cognitive structuring is one of the most common strategies humans use to
avoid information overload.173
2. Fluency

In the context of information processing, cognitive load can also be
reduced by presenting it in a fluent form. Fluency is the “subjective experience of ease or difficulty with which we are able to process
information.”174 In contrast with less fluent statements and authors, people
judge fluent statements as more true, likeable, frequent, and famous and
the authors of fluent statements to be more intelligent.175
So what exactly is fluent text and disfluent text? Some studies
generate disfluency through fonts that are difficult to read.176 While font
choice is important for legal writers,177 more-substantive concepts of

165 Id. at 350.
166 Id.
167 Herbert A. Simon, How Big is a Chunk?, 183 SCIENCE
482, 483 (1974).
168 Id. at 482.
169 Id. at 483.
170 Id.
171 Marcus, Cooper & Sweller, supra note 160, at 49.
172 Neuberg & Newsom, supra note 152, at 113.
173 Id.
174 Oppenheimer, The Secret Life of Fluency, supra note
161, at 237; see also Christian Unkelbach, The Learned
Interpretation of Cognitive Fluency, 17 PSYCHOL . SCIENCE
339, 339 (2006) (“Cognitive fluency is the experienced ease
of ongoing conceptual or perceptual cognitive processes.”).

175 Oppenheimer, The Secret Life of Fluency, supra note
161, at 237.
176 See Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley & Eyre, Overcoming
Intuition, supra note 161, at 570; Adam L. Alter, Daniel M.
Oppenheimer & Nicholas Epley, Disfluency Prompts
Analytic Thinking—But Not Always Greater Accuracy:
Response to Thompson et al., 128 C OGNITION 252, 253
(2013) [hereinafter Alter, Oppenheimer & Epley, Disfluency
Prompts Analytic Thinking]; Daniel M. Oppenheimer &
Michael C. Frank, A Rose in Any Other Font Would Not
Smell as Sweet: Effects of Perceptual Fluency on
Categorization, 106 COGNITION 1178, 1183 (2006) [hereinafter Oppenheimer & Frank, A Rose in Any Other Font].
177 See, e.g., M ATTHEW BUTTERICK , T YPOGRAPHY FOR
L AWYERS: E SSENTIAL TOOLS FOR P OLISHED AND
PERSUASIVE DOCUMENTS (2010).
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fluency are of greater relevance to this article. For instance, symmetry
produces a fluency effect. Study subjects judged the phrase “woes unite
foes” to be more true than “woes unite enemies.”178 One can also generate
fluency through repetition, because repeating something makes a thing
seem more familiar.179 The more we see something, the more we like it.180
Categories also produce fluency. This kind of fluency181 is related to
the familiarity that comes from repetition. Categories existing at the most
basic level (the most typical exemplar of a category) promote the most
amount of fluency. As fluency expert Daniel Oppenheimer and his
colleagues explain,
The most typical exemplars of a category are often the most frequent in
our experience, the most easily accessible in our memories, and the most
primed by recent experiences. Because of this, the experience of fluency
and the judgment of good category membership frequently co-occur
over the course of a lifetime’s experience.182

In terms of the writing itself, simplified syntax, shorter words, and
transition words promote fluency. For instance, in the context of students
taking tests, cognitive load was reduced (demonstrated by faster response
times) in the tests that employed simplified syntax: shorter sentences, lesscompound construction, and less use of infrequent syntactic forms such as
the passive voice.183 Transition words were also found to reduce the
reader’s cognitive load, because they made it easier for the mind to process
the connections between words.184 Daniel Oppenheimer and his associates reached similar results when they presented test subjects with two
versions of a translated Descartes essay.185 One essay was written with
complex words and a sophisticated grammatical structure, while the other
relied on more simple wording and syntax.186 Participants who read the
simpler version rated the author as more intelligent than those who read

178 Hyunjin Song & Norbert Schwartz, If It’s Easy to Read, It’s Easy to Do, Pretty, Good, and True, 23 THE PSYCHOLOGIST
108, 111 (2010) (citing M.S. McGlone & J. Tofighbakhsh, Birds of a Feather Flock Conjointly(?): Rhyme as Reason in
Aphorisms, 11 PSYCHOL. SCIENCE 424 (2000)).
179 Id. at 110, 111.
180 Id. at 111.
181 Categories function as a method of chunking information. See supra notes 171–73 and surrounding text.
182 Oppenheimer & Frank, A Rose In Any Other Font, supra note 176, at 1179.
183 See Bruce K. Britton, Shawn M. Glynn, Bonnie J. Meyer & M. J. Penland, Effects of Text Structure on Use of Cognitive
Capacity During Reading, 74 J. EDUC. PSYCHOL. 51, 54–56, 58 (1982).
184 Id. at 56, 58.
185 Daniel M. Oppenheimer, Consequences of Erudite Vernacular Utilized Irrespective of Necessity: Problems With Using
Long Words Needlessly, 20 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 139, 142–44 (2006).
186 Id. at 144.
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the more complex version.187 In a slight variation of the study, the negative
judgments about the author’s intelligence remained unequal, even when
the participants were told that the author was Rene Descartes.188
Readers interested in what fluency theory tells us about the plainlanguage debate should read Julie Baker’s informative article And The
Winner Is: How Principles of Cognitive Science Resolve the Plain Language
Debate.189 Professor Baker concludes that fluency principles mandate that
we use plain language to better engage legal readers.190 And, with respect
to cognitive load, Professor Carter reaches similar conclusions in his 2014
article in this journal.191
There is one wrinkle within fluency theory. In one study, Princeton
University students taking a difficult test performed better when the text
was printed in a difficult-to-read font.192 The theory is that the difficult
font triggered more system 2 (analytical thinking) than system 1 (intuitive
thinking) in the test subjects, which generated better answers.193 However,
a subsequent study replicated the results for test subjects with high IQs
(such as the original subjects) but not for subjects with lower IQs.194
It is doubtful whether this study can be applied to a professional legal
setting. First, the disfluency created through font may not be equivalent to
disfluency created by complex text (which is the most common form of
disfluency in legal writing). Second, the study setting (students taking a
test) is not analogous to a reader processing a legal argument. Third, I
would not recommend purposely presenting an argument in a disfluent
form when I know that my reader is busy, impatient, and highly intelligent
(i.e., a typical judge). There would be great risk that the judge would react
negatively and judge the writer intellectually incompetent. And finally, we
hope that judges will first intuitively grasp our arguments, but eventually
activate their analytical faculties to complete the decisionmaking process.
B. What The Theories of Cognitive Load and Fluency Tell Us
About Law’s Ancient Logocentric Thought Structures
From the cognitive science of information processing, theories of
cognitive load and fluency explain why ancient legal-thought structures,
which rely on formal analysis, syllogisms, and clean-cut categories, have
remained in our legal culture so long. These forms have stayed with us for

187 Id.

191 See Carter, supra note 154, at 50.

188 Id.

192 Alter, Oppenheimer, Epley & Eyre, Overcoming
Intuition, supra note 161, at 570.

189 Julie A. Baker, And The Winner Is: How Principles of
Cognitive Science Resolve the Plain Language Debate, 80
UMKC L. REV. 287 (2011–2012).
190 Id. at 301–04.

193 Id. at 570–71.
194 Alter, Oppenheimer & Epley, Disfluency Prompts
Analytic Thinking, supra note 176, at 254.
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so long because they allow us to efficiently process complex legal information. The tools of legal formalism help lawyers present the law’s
intricate and voluminous complexities in the most engaging way possible.
This section explains how legal syllogisms and categories help reduce the
reader’s cognitive load and increase the fluency of the text—rendering
arguments more accessible and, ultimately, more persuasive. In order to
mitigate the potential harm produced by deploying categories in an overly
rigid way, this section suggests a metaphor of translation, which can help
lawyers bridge the gap between the messy way that the facts and law
collide with the client and the clean and neat way that these law and facts
should be presented to the court.
The syllogism, the bedrock of formal legal reasoning, allows the legal
author to present highly complex information in a shorthand way. In so
doing, the syllogism fosters both chunking and fluency. The syllogism
breaks a point of argument into three lines, with three different categorical
terms:
Publication of information in a newsletter is dissemination to the public.
The defendant published information in a newsletter.
The defendant disseminated the information to the public.195

Here, the three terms are (1) publication of information in a
newsletter, (2) the defendant’s specific conduct of publishing information
in a newsletter, and (3) the legal conclusion, dissemination to the public.
The first line of the syllogism sets up the rule (or major premise) setting
forth the category (publication of information in a newsletter) that is a
necessary and sufficient condition for the legal conclusion (dissemination
to the public). The second line of the syllogism is concerned with equating
the defendant’s specific conduct with the condition necessary to establish
the legal conclusion. The third line of the syllogism then concludes the
formula in a way that cannot be denied.
The syllogism allows legal authors to chunk complicated information
and present it in a clean way. For instance, the legal element of “dissemination to the public” carries a lot more weight than the literal meaning of
its four words. It is an element of a privacy tort; it is something that
plaintiff must demonstrate to the court to prove his or her prima facie
case; and it references pages of legal precedents that have defined the
element over the years. Yet, in the syllogism, the writer can refer to all of
these competing pieces of information with four simple words, the words
of the category. In this way, the syllogism functions as a recoding device,

195 ROBBINS-TISCIONE, supra note 6, at 156.
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which allows the lawyer to increase the amount of information the
audience is able to grapple with.196 It enables the reader to process the
crux of the argument in an automated way, reducing his or her cognitive
load.197
The syllogism is also fluent because it is symmetrical and repetitive.
The symmetry occurs from the three lines and the way that the legal
conclusion is stated at both the end of the major premise (first line) and
the end of the conclusion (third line). Further, each of the three terms in a
syllogism is repeated twice. Each of these three terms qualify as a “phrase
that pays,” those valuable terms that should be distributed throughout a
written legal argument.198 From the information-processing studies such
as those by Oppenheimer and Simon, we know that both symmetry199 and
repetition200 engender the reader’s perception of fluency. Finally, the
syllogism’s reliance on elemental legal categories stated the same way in
case after case (i.e., dissemination to the public is an element of a privacy
tort) creates fluency because legal terms of art function as the most typical
exemplar of a category.201 Thus, the accessibility of meaning that flows
from using the well-known name of the legal element produces a fluency
effect.
The science of human information processing also explains how
concision, simplified structure, and clear transitive relationships promote
fluency effects.202 Information-processing theories also have advice for
where the writer should deploy syllogisms in his or her writing. In their
enlightening book, The Science Behind the Art of Legal Writing, Professors
Lance Long and Catherine Cameron explain that learners enjoy a higher
retention rate if material is presented to them in an “advance organizer”
overview form, before presenting the more-intricate substantive portions
of the argument.203
The “advance organizer” studies tell us that a short and simple
syllogism should appear in the beginning sections of a legal argument. The
core syllogisms should be embedded within the questions presented204

196 See supra notes 164–73 and accompanying text.
197 See supra notes 160–63 and 171–73 and accompanying text.
198 MARY BETH BEAzLEY, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO APPELLATE ADVOCACY 205 (3d ed. 2010).
199 See supra note 178 and accompanying text (explaining how “woes unite foes” was judged to be truer than “woes unite
enemies”).
200 See supra notes 179–180 and accompanying text.
201 See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
202 See supra notes 183–188.
203 CAMERON & LONG, supra note 12, at 79–81.
204 See BRYAN GARNER , THE WINNING BRIEF 85–91 (2d ed. 2004) (advocating that writers use a syllogistic framework to
draft the question presented).
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and woven throughout the summary of the argument. And then,
throughout the rest of the brief, the author should refer to his or her
syllogisms in point headings and paragraph topic sentences. Interestingly,
the studies that Long and Cameron cite also explain why the format of the
legal argument has remained unchanged for thousands of years. This
longstanding format, which places the questions presented, facts, and
summary of the argument first, easily enables lawyers to use advanced
organizers to present their clients’ cases. The ancients were so in tune with
modern cognitive science!
While the syllogism models legal formalism at the micro level, we can
broaden our scope to discern why formal reasoning with abstract categories remains so entrenched in Western legal culture. Cognitively, clean
and neat categories help us find our way through a mass of complicated
legal information. Again, the classical understanding of reason is eerily
aligned with modern cognitive science’s understanding of information
processing.
Though categories are useful and necessary, there are serious
drawbacks. For instance, as addressed above with the Dred Scott and
Plessy v. Ferguson cases, the use of logocentric categories make it easy to
draft facile arguments in support of injustice.205 The formal use of
abstract, clean categories does not reflect how we really think.206
Moreover, abstract categories tend to screen out messy facts that are not
compliant with the gestalt vision for what the category is or should be.
And these messy facts often relate to emotion, justice, dignity, and other
concepts that do not fit into the disembodied, rational norm for legal
thinking.207
Despite the negatives, clean categories are a necessary component of
legal analysis. In thinking about forms of legal analysis and making legal
analysis look more similar to how humans really think, Professor Winter
explains that
[n]o one who has studied the Talmud could possibly question its
analytical rigor. Yet, its style of reasoning and organization—which,
tracking oral changes in the Talmudic academies of Palestine and
Babylonia, sometimes borders on stream of consciousness—stands as a

205 See supra notes 74–78 and 102–05 and accompanying text (discussing the Dred Scott and Plessy v. Ferguson cases).
206 See supra section I(B)(i)(b).
207 Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as Translator, Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1298, 1303–31 (1992) (explaining the story of obtaining a good result for a client through dismissal of his
criminal case, yet leaving the client feeling dissatisfied because the legal system did not allow his voice to be heard or his
dignity to be restored.).
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sixty-volume tribute to the intricate, often convoluted rhythms of the
human mind.208

Mark Johnson writes that “we should think of our ethical and legal
concepts as, for the most part, having complex radial structures, manifesting prototype effects.”209 Professors Winter and Johnson have a great
point—perhaps we should think about the law in a more nonlinear way.
But in terms of writing legal arguments, a stream-of-consciousness and
radially structured argument will not work. As legal writing experts Steven
Armstrong and Tim Terrell explain, effective legal writers must be able to
turn the rocky and hilly terrain of Western Colorado into terrain that
looks more like the flat plains of Kansas.210
Translation provides a helpful metaphor for bridging the distance
between a cognitively realistic approach to the law (messy) and the way we
must present the law to legal audiences (neat). The lawyer’s job should be
to translate the client’s facts into the categorical forms that the law
recognizes.211 But, as with any kind of translation, meanings valued by the
client often get lost in the process.212 A good legal translator should strive
to collaborate with and translate the client’s story in a way that amplifies
the client’s voice in a legal setting, without changing the story’s core
meaning.213 In order to become effective translators for clients, lawyers
must first learn how to formally reason with legal categories. However, it is
also important for attorneys to come to these skills with a certain amount
of criticality and empathy. From a professional-development perspective,
the next section explains why it is so important for lawyers to acquire
specific knowledge and skills in category identification and construction.
It then describes a series of thought exercises that can be used to deepen
one’s understanding legal categories.

208 WINTER, supra note 81, at 61.
209 Johnson, supra note 23, at 852.
210 STEVEN ARMSTRONG & TIMOTHY TERRELL, THINKING LIKE A WRITER 4 (3d ed. 2009).
211 Cunningham, supra note 207, at 1299–300; White, An Old-Fashioned View of the Nature of Law, supra note 137, at
329–31.
212 See Cunningham, supra note 207, at 1303–31; see also Lucie E. White, Seeking “. . . The Faces of Otherness . . .”: A Response
to Professors Sarat, Felstiner, and Cahn, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1499, 1507 n.35 (1992) (explaining that advocacy is a “practice
of translation” but “translation is also replacement of the other’s voice”).
213 Cunningham, supra note 207, at 1303–31.
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IV. What Lawyers Should Know: Mastering Categories
as a Method for Developing Professional Expertise
From a professional-development perspective, there are three reasons
why every legal writer should gain a critical understanding of how legal
categories work. First, after mastering the basic meaning of a legal text, a
critical view of categories enables the advocate to gain metacognitive
knowledge. Metacognitive knowledge is higher order “thinking about
thinking.”214 A common kind of metacognitive strategy, for reading, is a
self-questioning process. If the reader can pose and answer his or her own
questions about the text, then he or she will be able to discern whether or
not she has grasped the material.215 In terms of learning theory, students
who practice metacognition tend to be better learners and enjoy higher
learning outcomes.216 If we apply this learning theory concept to law
practice, we can predict that lawyers with metacognitive knowledge will
obtain a deeper mastery of legal texts, which will then lead to facile uses of
those texts for advocacy purposes.
To use a cooking metaphor, metacognitive thinking functions as a
kind of prepping, slicing and dicing legal texts to shape them for optimal
use in a particular argument. In the context of interfacing with case
opinions, metacognition forms after the legal reader comprehends the
basic meanings of the text—rule, holding, facts, etc. At this point, the
reader can reverse-engineer the categorization process the judge used to
reach his or her holding and determine if those category choices were
sound.217 In so doing, the reader gains a deeper understanding of how the
judge manipulated the categories underlying the text and gains a vantage
point into how the text might be manipulated (prepped) in the future.
When this legal reader sits down to write on his or her client’s behalf, he
or she can deploy the categorization process to craft the most sophisticated and workable argument for her client’s needs.
Second, the skill of manipulating categories is an adaptive skill, a skill
that can be transferred to a variety of different legal settings.218
Practitioners with adaptive expertise function as expert virtuosos; practi-

214 John H. Flavell, Metacognition and Cognitive Monitoring A New Area of Cognitive-Developmental Inquiry, 34 A M.
PSYCHOLOGIST 906, 906 (1979); Jennifer A. Livingston, Metacognition: An Overview 2 (2003) (unpublished paper), available
at http://files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED474273.pdf ).
215 Livingston, supra note 214, at 4.
216 Id. at 5.
217 This analytical process is highly similar to Karl Llewellyn’s advice to critically question pre-existing legal categories. See
supra notes 108–11 and accompanying text.
218 COMMITTEE ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SCIENCE OF LEARNING, HOW PEOPLE LEARN: BRAIN, MIND, ExPERIENCE ,
AND SCHOOL 45 (2004).
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tioners without it operate as mere artisans.219 Artisans model competence,
whereas virtuosos innovate.220 Adaptive expertise is fueled by a deepseated metacognitive knowledge, the ability to monitor current
understanding of a problem and determine when it is not adequate.221 In
contrast to nonexperts, experts often do not stop analyzing a problem
when they have reached an initial understanding. Experts keep evaluating
the problem from different angles until they have a better conception of
the problem and can develop more-creative ways of solving it.222
In the context of categories, the lawyer with adaptive expertise
continues to wrestle with the text, even after he or she has grasped its
basic meaning. She or he will consider categorization choices and
determine whether different choices might produce different or better
outcomes. Lawyers armed with categorization skills will be able to
perceive innovative legal solutions that other lawyers may not see.
Becoming facile with categories pushes the lawyer toward the level of a
virtuoso, moving beyond the seemingly immovable legal text in a verbatim
case opinion.
Third, as Professor Melissa Weresh points out in her article, categorization is a skill that enables individuals to journey through the
knowledge portal that separates lay people from lawyers.223 Legal categories convey knowledge about malleability in the law, a threshold concept
in law.224 Threshold concepts are unique to a discipline, cause an irreversible change in a person’s cognitive understanding of the discipline, are
difficult and challenging (troublesome) to master, and are transformative.225 Professor Weresh persuasively theorizes that malleability of the
law is a threshold concept for law because it marks the difference between
law and other disciplines; it integrates several foundational concepts (such
as stare decisis, rule of law, and jurisdiction); it is irreversible once it is
mastered; it is troublesome (difficult); and, once it is mastered, it permanently transforms a person’s understanding of how the law works within
institutions and society.226 In order to effectively enter the portal into law’s

219 Id.
220 Id. at 46.
221 Id. at 47.
222 See id.
223 Melissa H. Weresh, Stargate: Malleability as a Threshold Concept in Legal Education, 63 J. OF LEG. EDUC . 689, 691
(2014).
224 Id. at 707–08.
225 Id. at 690 n.6, 710–11 (citing Ray Land, Glynis Cousin, Jan H.F. Meyer & Peter Davies, Threshold Concepts and
Troublesome knowledge: Implications for Course Design and Evaluation, in IMPROVING STUDENT LEARNING: DIVERSITY
AND INCLUSIVITY 53, 54 (Chris Rust ed., 2005).
226 Id. at 710–11.
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professional community, lawyers should master the skill of category
manipulation and shaping.
Expert advocates should be able to discern how categories shape the
law’s landscape as well as effectively use legal categories to customize legal
meanings for specific client situations. Expert advocates will choose
language that will affect the shape of legal categories, assert control over
legal texts, and influence the way that rules interact with the facts on the
ground. As illustrated below, the explicit manipulation of categories aids
advocates in constructing favorable rules and in developing effective
argument structures.
A. Rule Construction and Categories
To understand how to fluidly approach categories in constructing a
rule, consider the following simplified holding from a case on
entrapment:227
Case A: Held, an undercover police officer posing as a drug dealer did
entrap the defendant because the officer waved a revolver at the
defendant when he asked the defendant to buy drugs. But for the gun,
the defendant would not have committed the crime.

In crafting a standard, advocates for the defense would craft a fairly
broad rule with broad categories—an entrapment occurs when police
coerce with sufficient force to overcome the defendant’s reluctance to
commit the crime. Prosecutors would craft a narrower rule with more
distinct categories—a defendant is entrapped when police pressure him or
her at gunpoint or with other threat of bodily harm to commit a crime. In
this way, advocates use language to affect the size of a rule’s categorical
borders, which then affects the scope of the rule’s applicability. In order to
maintain credibility, however, the category must be situated within the
“reasonable zone of interpretation,” in alignment with the case holding.228
B. Categories, Enthymemes, and Syllogisms
Expert legal advocates should also master the art and craft of
persuasive syllogistic reasoning, the ability to deftly manipulate the categories in a simple structure to create intuitively persuasive arguments. For

227 David Romantz, Associate Dean of Academic Affairs at the University of Memphis School of Law, authored this exercise.
Professor Romantz presented this hypothetical during a presentation at the 2006 Legal Writing Institute Conference in
Indianapolis, Indiana.
228 Weresh, supra note 223, at 714, 726. See also id. at 710 n.131 (explaining that, in order for a legal interpretation to be
reasonable, it must comply with ethical and professional norms).
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instance, the masterful brief that appellants filed in Brown v. Board of
Education shows how syllogistic reasoning and category manipulation can
be used in tandem to create a shift in the law, in how legal categories are
understood. It also illustrates how the ancient form of the syllogism can be
used to craft an excellent, game-changing question presented.229
The other rhetorical device used in the Brown v. Board of Education
brief is the enthymeme, a rhetorical device that truncates a syllogism.
Because the enthymeme relies on a premise that everyone can agree with,
the reader fills in the missing piece of the syllogism in his or her mind.230
Consider the following sentence: we cannot trust her because she is a
politician. That sentence is a shortened form of the below syllogism:
Politicians are not trustworthy. [the omitted major premise]
This woman is a politician.
Therefore, we cannot trust this woman.231

In the appellants’ brief submitted in the Brown v. Board of
Education232 case, the advocates structured the second question presented
as follows:
Whether the finding of the court below—that racial segregation in public
elementary schools has the detrimental effect of retarding the mental
and educational development of [African American] children and
connotes governmental acceptance of the conception of racial inferiority—compels the conclusion that appellants here are deprived of
their rights to share equally in educational opportunities in violation of
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.233

When one attempts to extrapolate the syllogism within the above
question presented, the following syllogism emerges:
If a government policy imposes a detrimental effect on the education
and mental development of African American children and connotes
governmental acceptance of their racial inferiority in an educational
context, that policy deprives African American children of their rights to
share equally in educational opportunities, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
229 See GARNER, supra note 204, at 85–91 (advocating that legal writers should cast each question presented as a syllogism).
230 For an explanation and supporting citations for the enthymeme, see supra note 103.
231 See IAN BOGOST, PERSUASIVE GAMES: THE ExPRESSIVE POWER OF VIDEOGAMES 18 (2007).
232 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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Kansas City’s segregation policy both imposes a detrimental effect on the
educational and mental development of African American children and
connotes governmental acceptance of the inferiority of African
American children.
Kansas City’s segregation policy violates the Fourteenth Amendment.

In this example, the authors masterfully used the syllogistic form to
reshape the boundaries for equal-protection violations. The conjunctive
form of the syllogism—two separate sufficient conditions supporting a
constitutional violation—give the argument depth. The syllogistic foundation provides elegance and symmetry, making it seem like the
appellants’ proposed answer to the question is the only one possible. As
further context for this example, it is helpful to review Plessy v. Ferguson234
and analyze its use of formalistic reasoning. Viewing these two precedents
together demonstrates the overall effectiveness of fighting logos with logos
to bring about a seismic shift in furtherance of social justice.
Expert legal advocates might also use policy to define categories and
then amplify their power by slotting them into the classic syllogistic
structure.235 As policy necessarily engages with value judgments and value
judgments are themselves based on emotion, this technique allows the
legal writer to combine pathos and logos in a highly effective way.236
Moreover, this device introduces emotional reasoning into the argument
in a subtle way so as to “engage the judge’s emotions uninvited.”237 The
ability to silently inject pathos into logos is ever important in an appellate
context where judges greatly resent overt appeals to emotions.238
For an example of this technique, consider the Supreme Court’s
opinion in the koretmatsu case, which took place in a dark period of U.S.
history. Fred Toyosaburo Korematsu, an American citizen, refused to
comply with a military exclusion order that prohibited his presence in San
Leandro, California.239 Related to the exclusion order, the case also

233 Appellants’ Br. at 2, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
234 See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
235 Here, I credit and thank Professor Kathleen Burch at Atlanta’s John Marshall Law School, who shared this exercise and
her enthusiasm for syllogisms with me nearly a decade ago.
236 Legal writing that combines logos and pathos produces optimal results. See Kenneth D. Chestek, Judging by the
Numbers: An Empirical Study of the Power of Story, 7 J. ALWD 1, 10–22 (2010) (describing study in which, when presented
with two styles of briefs, one purely based on logos and one based on logos and pathos, judges uniformly preferred the logosand-pathos brief ).
237 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 10, at 32.
238 See id. at 32 (“Appealing to judges’ emotions is misguided . . . . It can have a nasty backlash.”).
239 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215–16 (1944) (rehearing denied February 12, 1945).
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involved the corralling of Japanese American citizens in detention
camps.240 Two competing syllogisms are discernible within both Justice
Hugo Black’s majority opinion and Justice Frank Murphy’s dissent.241
Justice Black uses the following syllogism to frame his decision:242
During war, the government may take measures to prevent sabotage and
espionage as long as those measures have a definite and close relationship to the prevention of sabotage and espionage.
Excluding all persons of Japanese descent has a definite and close relationship to espionage and sabotage.
The exclusion order is valid.

Justice Murphy’s dissent is structured with this syllogism:243
Military orders that limit civil rights in war must be reasonably
related to immediate public danger.
The exclusion order is not reasonably related to public danger
(because it assumes that all persons of Japanese descent pose a
security risk as per se subversive and political enemies).
The exclusion order is not proper.
When these two syllogisms are viewed side by side, one can see how
policy informs the author’s category choices. In this case, both jurists are
defining the boundaries for the category of justified constraints on a
citizen’s liberty. Stressing the interest of protecting safety and security
during wartime, Justice Black chose to include the prevention of espionage
and sabotage within his category.244 He also cast the category broadly,
merely requiring a “definite and close relationship” to the goal of
preventing espionage and sabotage.245 Justice Murphy emphasized the
civil rights of American citizens, and constructed the category more
narrowly. Rejecting the amorphous “definite and close relationship”

240 Id. at 225–26 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
241 Other justices also filed dissenting opinions in the case, but those opinions are less syllogistically structured.
242 Id. at 215–24 (majority opinion).
243 Id. at 233–42 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
244 Id. at 218 (majority opinion).
245 Id.
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standard, Justice Murphy would have required an “‘immediate, imminent,
and impending’ public danger” before allowing the military to limit a
citizen’s civil rights during wartime.246 In completing this review, one
appreciates how underlying policy choices (safety and security vs. civil
liberties) influence how a writer decides to structure the categories in her
formal legal argument.

V. Conclusion
The roots of our logocentric legal culture reach back thousands of
years. Cognitive science challenges two precepts of Western thought—a
belief in reason as a detached process that exists separate from the body
and a belief in clean-cut categories as mirroring the objective structure of
the external world. These two premises are not in line with how humans
actually reason and actually categorize information. Although these
precepts do not mirror how we think, they do reflect how we think we
think. The science on information processing then takes us to the
conclusion that how we think we think (clean categories) closely approximates how we best respond when complex information is presented to us.
In devising these forms so long ago, the ancient sages were
remarkably in tune with how our minds interact with information. While
the use of dichotomous categories can produce a fallacious sense of
certainty for legal conclusions, this style of reasoning is useful for its
powerful ability to persuade legal audiences. For lawyers, the skill of
category manipulation provides fuel for the journey from layperson to
professional lawyer. However, because of the unique power embedded
within categories, practitioners should be cognizant of the hidden relationships that can exist between category choices and unjust and unequal
outcomes.

246 Id. at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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